Philosophy They Aren㢂¬„¢t From Around Here. You Know That Just by Looking at Them.

Philosophical idea that merely one'due south own mind is sure to exist

Not to exist dislocated with Solecism.

Solipsism (; from Latin solus 'alone', and ipse 'self')^[one] is the philosophical idea that only one's mind is sure to exist. As an epistemological position, solipsism holds that noesis of anything outside 1's own listen is unsure; the external earth and other minds cannot be known and might not exist outside the heed.

Varieties [edit]

There are varying degrees of solipsism that parallel the varying degrees of skepticism:

Metaphysical [edit]

Metaphysical solipsism is a variety of solipsism. Based on a philosophy of subjective idealism, metaphysical solipsists maintain that the self is the simply existing reality and that all other realities, including the external globe and other persons, are representations of that self, and have no independent existence.^{[ citation needed ]} There are several versions of metaphysical solipsism, such every bit Caspar Hare's egoistic presentism (or perspectival realism), in which other people are witting, but their experiences are but not present.

Epistemological [edit]

Epistemological solipsism is the variety of idealism co-ordinate to which but the direct accessible mental contents of the solipsistic philosopher tin can exist known. The being of an external world is regarded as an unresolvable question rather than really false.^[2] Further, one cannot also be certain as to what extent the external globe exists independently of one'due south mind. For instance, information technology may be that a God-like being controls the sensations received by mind, making it appear as if at that place is an external world when almost of information technology (excluding the God-similar existence and oneself) is false. However, the point remains that epistemological solipsists consider this an "unresolvable" question.^[2]

Methodological [edit]

Methodological solipsism is an agnostic variant of solipsism. It exists in opposition to the strict epistemological requirements for "knowledge" (east.one thousand. the requirement that noesis must be sure). Information technology still entertains the points that whatsoever induction is fallible. Methodological solipsism sometimes goes even farther to say that fifty-fifty what nosotros perceive as the encephalon is actually office of the external world, for it is only through our senses that we can see or feel the mind. Simply the beingness of thoughts is known for certain.

Methodological solipsists do non intend to conclude that the stronger forms of solipsism are actually true. They simply emphasize that justifications of an external globe must be founded on indisputable facts near their own consciousness. The methodological solipsist believes that subjective impressions (empiricism) or innate knowledge (rationalism) are the sole possible or proper starting bespeak for philosophical construction.^[3] Often methodological solipsism is not held every bit a belief system, only rather used as a thought experiment to assist skepticism (e.g. Descartes' Cartesian skepticism).^{[ citation needed ]}

Primary points [edit]

Denial of material beingness, in itself, does non constitute solipsism.

A feature of the metaphysical solipsistic worldview is the denial of the existence of other minds. Since personal experiences are private and often considered ineffable, another beingness'due south experience tin be known only by illustration.

Philosophers try to build noesis on more than than an inference or analogy. The failure of Descartes' epistemological enterprise brought to popularity the thought that all certain knowledge may go no further than "I think; therefore I exist" ^[4] without providing any real details nigh the nature of the "I" that has been proven to be.

The theory of solipsism too merits close examination because it relates to three widely held philosophical presuppositions, each itself fundamental and wide-ranging in importance:^[4]

• I's most certain knowledge is the content of one's own mind—my thoughts, experiences, affects, etc.
• At that place is no conceptual or logically necessary link betwixt mental and concrete—betwixt, for instance, the occurrence of certain conscious experience or mental states and the "possession" and behavioral dispositions of a "trunk" of a particular kind.
• The experience of a given person is necessarily private to that person.

To expand on the 2nd point, the conceptual problem here is that the previous assumes heed or consciousness (which are attributes) tin can exist independent of some entity having this aspect (a capability in this case), i.e., that an attribute of an existent can exist autonomously from the real itself. If one admits to the existence of an independent entity (e.g., the brain) having that aspect, the door is open to an contained reality. (See Brain in a vat)

Some people agree that, while it cannot be proven that anything independent of one's mind exists, the point that solipsism makes is irrelevant. This is because, whether the globe as we perceive information technology exists independently or not, we cannot escape this perception (except via decease), hence information technology is best to human action assuming that the earth is independent of our minds. (Come across Falsifiability and testability below)^[5]

Nonetheless, being aware merely acknowledges its existence; information technology does not place the bodily creations until they are observed by the user.

History [edit]

Gorgias [edit]

Solipsism was first recorded past the Greek presocratic sophist, Gorgias (c. 483–375 BC) who is quoted by the Roman sceptic Sextus Empiricus every bit having stated:^[6]

• Aught exists.
• Even if something exists, cipher can be known about information technology.
• Fifty-fifty if something could exist known nearly information technology, knowledge about it cannot be communicated to others.

Much of the point of the sophists was to show that objective knowledge was a literal impossibility.

Descartes [edit]

The foundations of solipsism are in turn the foundations of the view that the private'south understanding of any and all psychological concepts (thinking, willing, perceiving, etc.) is accomplished by making an illustration with his or her ain mental states; i.east., past brainchild from inner experience. And this view, or some variant of it, has been influential in philosophy since Descartes elevated the search for incontrovertible certainty to the status of the primary goal of epistemology, whilst also elevating epistemology to "first philosophy".^{[ citation needed ]}

Berkeley [edit]

George Berkeley'southward arguments against materialism in favour of idealism provide the solipsist with a number of arguments not found in Descartes. While Descartes defends ontological dualism, thus accepting the beingness of a fabric globe (res extensa) as well as immaterial minds (res cogitans) and God, Berkeley denies the existence of matter but not minds, of which God is one.^[seven]

Relation to other ideas [edit]

Idealism and materialism [edit]

One of the nearly central debates in philosophy concerns the "true" nature of the world—whether information technology is some ethereal aeroplane of ideas or a reality of diminutive particles and free energy. Materialism^[viii] posits a real "world out there", likewise as in and through the states, that can be sensed—seen, heard, tasted, touched and felt, sometimes with prosthetic technologies corresponding to human sensing organs. (Materialists do non merits that man senses or even their prosthetics tin can, fifty-fifty when collected, sense the totality of the universe; simply that they collectively cannot sense what cannot in any way exist known to united states of america.)

Materialists practise not find this a useful way of thinking about the ontology and ontogeny of ideas, but nosotros might say that from a materialist perspective pushed to a logical extreme communicable to an idealist, ideas are ultimately reducible to a physically communicated, organically, socially and environmentally embedded 'brain country'. While reflexive being is not considered by materialists to exist experienced on the atomic level, the individual's concrete and mental experiences are ultimately reducible to the unique tripartite combination of environmentally determined, genetically determined, and randomly determined interactions of firing neurons and atomic collisions.

For materialists, ideas accept no master reality equally essences split from our physical being. From a materialist perspective, ideas are social (rather than purely biological), and formed and transmitted and modified through the interactions between social organisms and their social and concrete environments. This materialist perspective informs scientific methodology, insofar equally that methodology assumes that humans have no access to omniscience and that therefore human knowledge is an ongoing, commonage enterprise that is best produced via scientific and logical conventions adjusted specifically for material human capacities and limitations.^{[ commendation needed ]}

Modern idealists believe that the mind and its thoughts are the only true things that exist. This is the reverse of what is sometimes chosen "classical idealism" or, somewhat confusingly, "Platonic idealism" due to the influence of Plato's theory of forms (εἶδος eidos or ἰδέα thought) which were not products of our thinking.^[9] The material world is ephemeral, but a perfect triangle or "beauty" is eternal. Religious thinking tends to be some form of idealism, as God normally becomes the highest ideal (such as neoplatonism).^{[8] [10] [11]} On this scale, solipsism can be classed equally idealism. Thoughts and concepts are all that exist, and furthermore, merely the solipsist'due south own thoughts and consciousness exist. The so-chosen "reality" is nothing more than than an idea that the solipsist has (perhaps unconsciously) created.

Cartesian dualism [edit]

There is another selection: the belief that both ideals and "reality" exist. Dualists commonly argue that the distinction between the mind (or 'ideas') and matter tin can be proven by employing Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles, which states that if two things share exactly the same qualities, and so they must be identical, as in duplicate from each other and therefore ane and the same thing. Dualists then attempt to identify attributes of mind that are lacked by thing (such every bit privacy or intentionality) or vice versa (such equally having a certain temperature or electric accuse).^{[12] [13]} 1 notable application of the identity of indiscernibles was by René Descartes in his Meditations on First Philosophy. Descartes concluded that he could non incertitude the existence of himself (the famous cogito ergo sum argument), just that he could doubt the (separate) being of his body. From this, he inferred that the person Descartes must not be identical to the Descartes body since one possessed a characteristic that the other did not: namely, it could be known to exist. Solipsism agrees with Descartes in this attribute, and goes farther: simply things that tin be known to exist for sure should be considered to be. The Descartes body could only exist equally an idea in the mind of the person Descartes.^{[fourteen] [15]} Descartes and dualism aim to show the actual existence of reality equally opposed to a phantom existence (besides equally the existence of God in Descartes' case), using the realm of ideas merely as a starting point, but solipsism usually finds those further arguments unconvincing. The solipsist instead proposes that their ain unconscious is the author of all seemingly "external" events from "reality".

Philosophy of Schopenhauer [edit]

The World as Will and Representation is the central work of Arthur Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer saw the human being will as our one window to the world behind the representation, the Kantian affair-in-itself. He believed, therefore, that we could proceeds knowledge about the affair-in-itself, something Kant said was incommunicable, since the rest of the relationship between representation and thing-in-itself could exist understood by analogy as the human relationship between human being volition and man body.

Idealism [edit]

The idealist philosopher George Berkeley argued that physical objects practise non be independently of the mind that perceives them. An item truly exists merely as long as it is observed; otherwise, it is not just meaningless but merely nonexistent. Berkeley does attempt to show things can and do be apart from the human mind and our perception, only only because there is an all-encompassing Mind in which all "ideas" are perceived – in other words, God, who observes all. Solipsism agrees that nothing exists outside of perception, but would argue that Berkeley falls prey to the egocentric predicament – he can only make his ain observations, and thus cannot exist truly sure that this God or other people be to observe "reality". The solipsist would say it is better to disregard the unreliable observations of alleged other people and rely upon the immediate certainty of one'southward own perceptions.^[16]

Rationalism [edit]

Rationalism is the philosophical position that truth is all-time discovered by the use of reasoning and logic rather than by the apply of the senses (meet Plato's theory of forms). Solipsism is also skeptical of sense-data.

Philosophical zombie [edit]

The theory of solipsism crosses over with the theory of the philosophical zombie in that other seemingly conscious beings may actually lack truthful consciousness, instead they merely display traits of consciousness to the observer, who may exist the just witting existence there is.

Falsifiability and testability [edit]

Solipsism is not a falsifiable hypothesis every bit described past Karl Popper: in that location does not seem to be an imaginable disproof.^[17]

According to Popper: a hypothesis that cannot exist falsified is non scientific, and a solipsist can observe "the success of sciences" (see also no miracles argument).

Ane critical examination is nevertheless to consider the induction from experience that the externally appreciable world does not seem, at first approach, to exist directly manipulable purely past mental energies solitary. One can indirectly manipulate the world through the medium of the physical torso, but it seems impossible to do and then through pure idea (psychokinesis). It might be argued that if the external earth were merely a construct of a single consciousness, i.e. the self, information technology could then follow that the external world should be somehow directly manipulable by that consciousness, and if it is not, then solipsism is false. An statement against this states that this argument is round and incoherent. It assumes at the beginning a "construct of a single consciousness" significant something simulated, then tries to manipulate the external world that it only assumed was faux. Of course this is an impossible task, but it does not disprove solipsism. It is simply poor reasoning when considering pure idealized logic and that'south why David Deutsch states that when also other scientific methods are used (non only logic) solipsism is "indefensible", likewise when using the simplest explanations: "If, co-ordinate to the simplest explanation, an entity is complex and autonomous, and so that entity is existent."^[18]

The method of the typical scientist is materialist: they first assume that the external world exists and can be known. But the scientific method, in the sense of a predict-observe-modify loop, does non crave the supposition of an external world. A solipsist may perform a psychological exam on themselves, to discern the nature of the reality in their mind – however David Deutsch uses this fact to counter-argue: "outer parts" of solipsist, behave independently so they are independent for "narrowly" defined (conscious) cocky.^[eighteen] A solipsist's investigations may not be proper scientific discipline, yet, since it would not include the co-operative and communitarian aspects of scientific inquiry that normally serve to diminish bias.

Minimalism [edit]

Solipsism is a course of logical minimalism. Many people are intuitively unconvinced of the nonexistence of the external globe from the basic arguments of solipsism, merely a solid proof of its existence is non available at nowadays. The central assertion of solipsism rests on the nonexistence of such a proof, and strong solipsism (as opposed to weak solipsism) asserts that no such proof can exist made. In this sense, solipsism is logically related to agnosticism in religion: the distinction between believing you do not know, and believing you could not have known.

Withal, minimality (or parsimony) is non the just logical virtue. A common misapprehension of Occam'southward razor has information technology that the simpler theory is always the best. In fact, the principle is that the simpler of two theories of equal explanatory power is to be preferred. In other words: additional "entities" can pay their style with enhanced explanatory ability. So the realist can merits that, while their earth view is more circuitous, it is more satisfying every bit an explanation.

Solipsism in infants [edit]

Some developmental psychologists believe that infants are solipsistic, and that eventually children infer that others have experiences much like theirs and reject solipsism.^[19]

Hinduism [edit]

The earliest reference to Solipsism is found in the ideas in Hindu philosophy in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, dated to early 1st millennium BC.^[20] The Upanishad holds the mind to be the just god and all actions in the universe are thought to be a result of the mind assuming infinite forms.^[21] After the development of distinct schools of Indian philosophy, Advaita Vedanta and Samkhya schools are thought to have originated concepts similar to solipsism.^{[ citation needed ]}

Advaita Vedanta [edit]

Advaita is 1 of the vi well-nigh known Hindu philosophical systems and literally means "non-duality". Its first great consolidator was Adi Shankaracharya, who continued the work of some of the Upanishadic teachers, and that of his teacher's instructor Gaudapada. By using diverse arguments, such as the analysis of the 3 states of feel—wakefulness, dream, and deep sleep, he established the singular reality of Brahman, in which Brahman, the universe and the Atman or the Self, were one and the same.

I who sees everything every bit cypher simply the Cocky, and the Self in everything one sees, such a seer withdraws from nothing. For the enlightened, all that exists is nothing but the Self, and so how could whatever suffering or delusion continue for those who know this oneness?

The concept of the Self in the philosophy of Advaita could be interpreted as solipsism. However, the transhuman, theological implications of the Self in Advaita protect it from true solipsism as found in the west. Similarly, the Vedantic text Yogavasistha, escapes charge of solipsism because the real "I" is thought to be nothing but the accented whole looked at through a particular unique bespeak of interest.^[22]

Advaita is also thought to strongly diverge from solipsism in that, the former is a organization of exploration of one's mind in order to finally sympathize the nature of the self and reach complete noesis. The unity of existence is said to be directly experienced and understood at the terminate as a function of complete knowledge. On the other hand, solipsism posits the not-existence of the external world right at the beginning, and says that no further inquiry is possible.^{[ citation needed ]}

Samkhya and Yoga [edit]

Samkhya philosophy, which is sometimes seen as the basis of Yogic thought,^[23] adopts a view that matter exists independently of private minds. Representation of an object in an individual mind is held to be a mental approximation of the object in the external earth.^[24] Therefore, Samkhya chooses representational realism over epistemological solipsism. Having established this distinction between the external earth and the mind, Samkhya posits the existence of two metaphysical realities Prakriti (matter) and Purusha (consciousness).

Buddhism [edit]

Some interpretations of Buddhism assert that external reality is an illusion, and sometimes this position is [mis]understood as metaphysical solipsism. Buddhist philosophy, though, more often than not holds that the mind and external phenomena are both as transient, and that they arise from each other. The mind cannot exist without external phenomena, nor can external phenomena exist without the heed. This relation is known equally "dependent arising" (pratityasamutpada).

The Buddha stated, "Within this fathom long torso is the world, the origin of the world, the cessation of the world and the path leading to the cessation of the earth".^[25] Whilst non rejecting the occurrence of external phenomena, the Buddha focused on the illusion created within the heed of the perceiver by the process of ascribing permanence to impermanent phenomena, satisfaction to unsatisfying experiences, and a sense of reality to things that were finer insubstantial.

Mahayana Buddhism also challenges the illusion of the thought that one tin can experience an 'objective' reality independent of individual perceiving minds.

From the standpoint of Prasangika (a co-operative of Madhyamaka thought), external objects practise exist, merely are devoid of whatsoever type of inherent identity: "Simply as objects of mind do not be [inherently], mind also does non exist [inherently]".^[26] In other words, even though a chair may physically exist, individuals can only experience information technology through the medium of their own listen, each with their own literal betoken of view. Therefore, an independent, purely 'objective' reality could never be experienced.

The Yogacara (sometimes translated as "Mind only") schoolhouse of Buddhist philosophy contends that all homo experience is synthetic by mind. Some afterwards representatives of 1 Yogacara subschool (Prajnakaragupta, Ratnakīrti) propounded a form of idealism that has been interpreted as solipsism. A view of this sort is contained in the 11th-century treatise of Ratnakirti, "Refutation of the existence of other minds" (Santanantara dusana), which provides a philosophical refutation of external mind-streams from the Buddhist standpoint of ultimate truth (as singled-out from the perspective of everyday reality).^[27]

In add-on to this, the Bardo Thodol, Tibet'south famous book of the dead, repeatedly states that all of reality is a figment of ane's perception, although this occurs within the "Bardo" realm (post-mortem). For case, inside the sixth office of the section titled "The Root Verses of the Half dozen Bardos", there appears the following line: "May I recognize whatever appeareth every bit being mine own thought-forms";^[28] there are many lines in like ideal.

See also [edit]

• Abomination
• Antiscience
• Aseity
• Alfred Binet – The mind and the brain
• Cartesian doubt
• Centered world
• Cognitive closure (philosophy)
• Consensus reality
• Cotard delusion - the opposite
• Dream argument
• Eliminative materialism - the thought that even aspects of 1'south mind may non exist sure to be
• Ethical solipsism
• Existential nihilism
• Externism
• Heinlein'due south World as Myth
• Henry Rollins's Solipsist
• Immaterialism
• LaVeyan Satanism
• Metaphysical nihilism
• Heed over matter
• Model-dependent realism
• Object permanence
• Objective idealism
• Open individualism
• Panpsychism
• Personal horizon
• Phaneron
• Phenomenalism
• Philosophical realism
• Postmodernism
• Post-structuralism
• Main/secondary quality distinction – John Locke'due south response to solipsism
• Problem of other minds
• Protagoras of Abdera
• Solipsism syndrome
• Stream of consciousness
• Subjectivity
• The Egg
• The Truman Show mirage
• Vertiginous question

Notes [edit]

1. ^ "solipsism". Online Etymology Dictionary.
2. ^ ^{a b} "Philosophical Dictionary:Solipsism". Archived from the original on 3 January 2017. Retrieved viii April 2017.
3. ^ Wood, Ledger (1962). Dictionary of Philosophy. Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, and Company. p. 295.
4. ^ ^{a b} Thornton, Stephen P. (24 Oct 2004). "Solipsism and the Problem of Other Minds". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
5. ^ "Is at that place a convincing philosophical rebuttal to solipsism - See comment past Seth, Edinburgh Scotland". TheGuardian.com. Archived from the original on v June 2016. Retrieved 8 April 2017.
6. ^ Edward Craig; Routledge (Firm) (1998). Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Genealogy to Iqbal. Taylor & Francis US. p. 146. ISBN978-0-415-18709-1.
7. ^ Jones, N.; Berkeley, Grand. (2009). Starting with Berkeley. Starting with. Continuum. p. 105. ISBN978-one-84706-186-7. LCCN 2008053026.
8. ^ ^{a b} Herbermann, Charles, ed. (1913). "Materialism". Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Visitor.
9. ^ Herbermann, Charles, ed. (1913). "Idealism". Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company.
10. ^ Loflin, Lewis. "Notes on Neoplatonism and the relation to Christianity and Gnosticism".
11. ^ "German Idealism". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 16 April 2001.
12. ^ DePoe, John M. "A Defence of Dualism". New Dualism Archive.
13. ^ Herbermann, Charles, ed. (1913). "Dualism". Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company.
14. ^ Calef, Scott (9 June 2005). "Dualism and Mind". Cyberspace Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
15. ^ Thornton, Stephen P. (24 Oct 2004). "Solipsism and the Trouble of Other Minds". Net Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
16. ^ Khashaba, D.R. (28 July 2002). "Subjectivism and Solipsism". Philosophy Pathways (37).
17. ^ Popper, Karl (2000). Knowledge and the body-listen problem: in defence of interaction (Repr. ed.). London: Routledge. p. 106. ISBN0-415-13556-7.
18. ^ ^{a b} Deutsch, David. (1997) Material of Reality
19. ^ Flanagan, Owen J. (1991). The Science of the Mind . MIT Printing. pp. 144. ISBN9780262560566 . Retrieved 22 October 2008. baby solipsism.
20. ^ King, Richard; Ācārya, Gauḍapāda (1995), Early Advaita Vedānta and Buddhism: the Mahāyāna context of the Gauḍapādīya-kārikā, SUNY Press, p. 52, ISBN978-0-7914-2513-8
21. ^ Krishnananda, (Swami). The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad. Divine Life Society, Rishikesh. P. 248.
22. ^ O'Flaherty, Wendy Doniger. Dreams, Illusion, and Other Realities. Academy of Chicago, 1984. pp. 120–one. ISBN 0-226-61855-2.
23. ^ Radhankrishnan, Indian Philosophy, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1971 edition, Volume Two, p. 342.
24. ^ Isaac, J. R.; Dangwal, Ritu; Chakraborty, C. Proceedings. International conference on cognitive systems (1997). Allied Publishers Ltd. pp. 341–ii. ISBN 81-7023-746-7.
25. ^ "Rohitassa Sutta: To Rohitassa". www.accesstoinsight.org . Retrieved 14 April 2018.
26. ^ Chandrakirti, Guide to the Middle Way vi:71cd, translation in Sea of Nectar: Wisdom and Compassion in Mahayana Buddhism, London: Tharpa Publications, p. 253.
27. ^ A. C. Senape McDermott (2013). An Eleventh-Century Buddhist Logic of 'Exists': Ratnakīrti'south Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ Vyatirekātmikā. Foundations of linguistic communication. Vol. 2. Springer-Scientific discipline Business Media. p. i. ISBN978-94-017-6322-half dozen.
28. ^ "The Tibetan Book of the Expressionless Or the After-Death Experiences on the Bardo Airplane" (PDF). Translated by Lāma Kazi Dawa-Samdup. holybooks.com.

References [edit]

• Carus, Titus Lucretius (c. 50 BC). De Rerum Natura [On the Nature of Things]. ISBN84-85708-46-6.
• Khashaba, D.R. (28 July 2002). "Subjectivism and Solipsism". Philosophy Pathways (37).
• Peake, Anthony (2006). Is In that location Life After Death?. Arcturus–Foulsham (Europe), Chartwell Books (US). ISBN0-7858-2162-7. This book presents an intriguing and scientifically based updating of solipsism involving the latest findings in quantum physics, neurology and consciousness studies.
• Popper, K.R.; Eccles, J.C. (1977). The Self and Its Brain . Heidelberg, Federal republic of germany: Springer-Verlag. ISBN0-387-08307-3.
• Russell, Bertrand (1988) [1912]. The Problems of Philosophy. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books. ISBN0-7546-1210-4.
• Russell, Bertrand (1995) [1921]. The Analysis of Mind. London: Routledge. ISBN0-415-09097-0.
• von Schubert Soldern, Richard (1982). Über Transcendenz des Objects und Subjects. Leipzig.
• Thornton, Stephen P. (24 October 2004). "Solipsism and the Trouble of Other Minds". In Fieser, James; Dowden, Bradley (eds.). Cyberspace Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1974). Philosophical Investigations. Blackwell. ISBN0-631-19064-three.
• Wood, Ledger (1962). "Solipsism". In Runes (ed.). Lexicon of Philosophy. Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, and Company. p. 295.
• Nagai, Hitoshi (1996). Philosophy for Kids!,『〈子ども〉のための哲学』. Tokyo, Nippon: Kodansha.

Further reading [edit]

• Runes, Dagobert D., ed. (1962). Dictionary of Philosophy. Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, and Company.
• Neilson, W.A.; Knott, T.A.; Carhart, P.W., eds. (1950). Webster's New International Lexicon of the English Language (Second, Unabridged ed.). Springfield, MA: G. & C. Merriam Company.
• Mish, Frederick C., ed. (1983). Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary. Springfield, MA: Merriam–Webster.

External links [edit]

Look upward solipsism in Wiktionary, the gratuitous dictionary.

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Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solipsism